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The Rise and Fall of Solidarity 
Wage Policy? 
Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
Wage inequality in Sweden declined precipitously during the  1960s and the 
1970s. There was a sharp reduction in overall wage dispersion and in the rela- 
tive earnings advantage of highly educated workers,  a marked narrowing of 
wage differences between men and women, and a trend increase in youth rela- 
tive wages. There was also a substantial narrowing of wage differentials among 
workers within broad occupation and education groups. 
The trend decline in wage inequality was broken in the 1980s. Wage differ- 
entials have widened along several dimensions from the mid-1980s to the early 
1990s. There has been a modest rise in overall wage inequality and some in- 
crease in educational wage differentials, and the trend increase in youth relative 
wages has been reversed. Wage inequality within manual as well as nonmanual 
occupations has widened. 
The pattern of decreasing wage differentials during the 1970s and expanding 
differentials during the  1980s is not  a feature that is unique to the Swedish 
labor market. Wage differentials by education and occupation declined during 
the  1970s in a number of  countries, whereas the  1980s have seen rising  in- 
equality, notably in Britain and the United States (see, e.g., Bound and Johnson 
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1992; Davis  1992; and  Katz,  Loveman,  and Blanchflower, chap.  1 in this 
volume). 
Much of the Swedish discussion has taken it for granted that the pay com- 
pression has been driven by the egalitarian ambitions of strong and coordinated 
trade unions. Indeed, the period of narrowing wage differentials coincides with 
the heydays of the “solidarity wage policy,” the deliberate attempt by the main 
union confederations to reduce wage dispersion. The years of widening wage 
differentials coincide with a period when centralized bargaining loses its edge. 
A conclusion that movements in wage inequality can be traced to institutional 
forces lies therefore close at hand. Our analysis of the Swedish wage structure 
suggests that institutions are only part of the story. We show that conventional 
demand and supply factors can go a substantial way toward explaining some 
key relative wage movements in Sweden. 
The plan of  the paper is as follows. We begin in section 9.1 with a brief 
overview of the institutional background. Section 9.2 turns to a comprehensive 
documentation of  the changes in the Swedish wage structure that took place 
from the 1960s on. By means of estimated wage equations for several different 
years we decompose the changes in wage dispersion into changes in individual 
characteristics and in returns to these characteristics and into residual changes. 
Section 9.3 discusses alternative explanations of the observed patterns. To what 
extent have sectoral shifts affected the relative demand for skilled labor? Are 
the movements in the wage dispersion driven by changes in the relative supply 
of skilled labor? Is there any evidence that changing institutional conditions in 
the labor market, in particular the breakdown of centralized wage bargaining, 
have influenced wage behavior? Section 9.4 examines whether pay compres- 
sion has resulted in a deterioration of the labor market for youths, and section 
9.5 looks at the relations between the returns to schooling and the demand for 
higher education. Section 9.6 concludes. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 
1. The sharp pay  compression  that took place during the  1960s and the 
1970s has  been  partly  reversed  during the  1980s. Wage compression  was 
mainly due to narrowing age and education differentials as well as decreasing 
wage differentials between males and females. The recent widening of wage 
differentials is largely an increase in within-group dispersion. 
2.  The returns to higher education decreased sharply from the late 1960s 
and up to the mid-l980s, followed by a rebound during the second half of the 
1980s. The main source of these fluctuations appears to be fluctuations in the 
relative supply of university-educated labor. 
3. Youth relative wages increased continuously over the 1970s and up to the 
mid-l980s, with a slight trend reversal in the period thereafter. These move- 
ments are largely consistent with fluctuations in the relative supply of young 
and older workers. 
4.  Youth employment has shown substantial responsiveness with respect to 309  The Swedish Wage Structure 
fluctuations in the size of the youth population. It is not obvious that pay com- 
pression has resulted in severe distortions in the youth labor market. 
5.  School  enrollment  among  twenty-  to  twenty-four-year-olds  has been 
highly responsive to the returns to university education. The demand for higher 
education declined as the university  wage premium decreased. This led to a 
deceleration in the rate of growth of university-educated labor, which in turn 
resulted in a rebound of the university wage premium in the late 1980s. 
9.1  The Institutional Setting 
9.1.1  Industrial Relations in Sweden 
Sweden has  a reputation  for peaceful  labor relations.’ This reputation  is 
based on Sweden’s experience after World War 11, where labor conflicts have 
been rare events. Labor relations in previous decades were much less peaceful, 
however. The number  of  annual  workdays  lost owing to conflicts  typically 
amounted  to one or several  millions  during the interwar period;  the corre- 
sponding figures during the  1950s and the  1960s were typically fewer than 
100,000 days. 
An  important turning point is the “Basic Agreement” from 1938 between 
LO (the Swedish trade union confederation) and SAF (the Swedish employers’ 
federation). This agreement-commonly  referred to as Sulfsjobudsuvtakf- 
defined a set of rules for conflict resolutions, which together with previously 
introduced legislation  formed a basis  for more peaceful  labor relations. The 
legislation  included a law on collective agreements from 1928, which made 
conflicts illegal after a contract had been signed. A labor court was also intro- 
duced in 1928 to handle disputes over contracts. 
LO was founded in 1898 and is still the largest union confederation, with a 
membership over 2.2 million and twenty-three affiliated unions. LO organizes 
blue-collar workers  in both  the private  and the public  sectors. White-collar 
union confederations were formed just after World War 11,  and their member- 
ship figures have been gradually increasing during the postwar period. TCO- 
the central organization for  salaried employees-is  the largest white-collar 
confederation with over 1.2 million members among twenty affiliated unions. 
The third major organization is SACO-the  Swedish confederation of profes- 
sional associations-with  330,000 members and twenty-five unions. SAC0  is 
almost exclusively an organization for employees with a university education. 
By international standards, a very high share of the Swedish workforce is 
unionized. According to the labor force surveys, 81 percent of employees were 
union  members  in  1991, and unionization  rates  show  negligible  variations 
I. The section draws primarily  on  Calmfors  and Forslund  (1991), Elvander  (1988), Hibbs 
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across broad education and occupation groups. For example, employees with a 
university education have union membership rates close to the average. Union 
membership rates are higher in the public sector than in the private; in 1990, 
the figures were 90 and 74 percent, respectively (Statistics Sweden 1992). 
Union density has fallen sharply in many countries over the past decade. 
Sweden has so far experienced very little of this decline, although the number 
of union members fell in 1987 for the first time since the 1930s.  There has been 
a slight decrease in unionization rates since 1987, mainly due to decreasing 
membership rates among young workers. 
The growth of the public sector, in conjunction with increasing union mem- 
bership rates among white-collar workers, has gradually eroded LO’S dominant 
position among the union confederations. LO accounted for 80 percent of the 
total union membership in 1950 but less than 60 percent in 1990.  Public-sector 
unions increased their share of the total number of union members from 26 to 
42 percent during the same period. 
The growth of public-sector and white-collar unions has reduced the relative 
importance of LO and SAF in the wage rounds. LO and SAF were the two key 
players in the heydays of  “the Swedish model,” when their wage agreements 
for the private sector worked as guideposts for the rest of  the labor market. 
This has become an increasingly less accurate description of the Swedish wage 
negotiation system. A new private-sector player was formed in the early 1970s, 
a negotiation cartel (PTK) comprising private-sector employees from primarily 
TCO and SACO. (TCO and SACO do not as central organizations take direct 
part in the wage negotiations.) SAF and PTK struck several central agreements 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
In 1965,  public-sector employees were given the right to bargain over wages, 
including the right to strike. Employer organizations for the central and local 
governments have since then regularly negotiated with public-sector unions, 
with substantial coordination on both sides of  the bargaining table. Private- 
sector wage  agreements have  in  general been  struck before  public-sector 
agreements. Statistical studies of intersectoral wage linkages confirm this pat- 
tern; wage increases in the private sector have typically preceded (“Granger 
caused”) public-sector wage increases (Holmlund and Ohlsson 1992). 
9.1.2  Coordination and Solidarity: Theory and Practice 
The term solidarity wage policy was coined in the late 1930s,  but egalitarian 
ideas have a long history in LO. Demands for wage equalization among differ- 
ent groups within LO were regularly voiced during the LO congresses, typi- 
cally closely related to demands for a more centralized bargaining structure 
within LO. LO had in fact little influence over its constituent unions during its 
early history. For example, no central negotiations between LO and SAF took 
place during the period 1909-36. 
The year  1936 seems to have  been one of  takeoff for the solidarity wage 
policy. In that year the metalworkers’ union placed a motion before the LO 311  The Swedish Wage Structure 
congress recommending a “socialist wage policy, with the emphasis on solidar- 
ity.” The motion recognized, however, that LO had limited possibilities of pur- 
suing such a policy in practice. The idea that coordination  was a necessary 
prerequisite for solidarity was developed and refined in a number of articles 
and LO reports during the following decade. Of particular importance in this 
regard  were  the  writings  of  the  LO  economists  Gosta  Rehn  and  Rudolf 
Meidner. (For an account of this discussion, see Turvey [1952].) 
Rehn and Meidner argued that coordination should be seen not only as a 
device to achieve a wage policy of  solidarity but also as a means to promote 
growth and structural change in the economy. The guiding principle should be 
“equal pay for equal work,” irrespective of the ability to pay among particular 
firms or industries. The principle might be viewed  as an attempt to use the 
centralized union’s visible hand to achieve a wage structure that would appear 
in a competitive labor market. The Rehn-Meidner program did not rule out 
wage differences among workers with different skills or working conditions, 
only differences based on firms’ profitability. The program did recognize, how- 
ever, that a wage policy  of  this kind  might put pressure on weak firms and 
ultimately cause unemployment in certain industries or regions. The solidarity 
wage policy should therefore be combined with an active labor market policy 
to facilitate the relocation of workers made redundant in less efficient firms. 
A solidarity wage policy and an active labor market policy-two  basic in- 
gredients of what has been referred to as “the Swedish model”-were  gradu- 
ally initiated in practice during the  1950s. The first centralized wage round 
between LO and SAF took place in  1952, but coordination did not become a 
permanent feature of such negotiations until  1956. In fact, LO participated in 
the  1952 wage round reluctantly, SAF this time being the eager supporter of 
coordination. This SAF policy seems to have originated in the view that cen- 
tralization  might be conducive to wage moderation by  preventing  excessive 
leapfrogging. 
Recent econometric work suggests that wage differentials in Sweden reflect 
industry rents to a much smaller extent than  wages in the United  States do 
(Holmlund and Zetterberg  1991; Edin and Zetterberg  1992). This finding is 
clearly consistent with the objectives of the solidarity wage policy. Equal pay 
for equal work is only one facet of solidarity wage policy, however. Another, 
based on strong ideological convictions among the union leaders and the mem- 
bership at large, is wage equalization. There has always been a tension between 
these two facets of the solidarity wage policy. To some extent pay compression 
could be justified as establishing equal pay for equal work; an example is wage 
hikes for female workers and the abolition of  special female wage scales. In 
other cases it was not at all clear what the operational content of equal pay for 
equal work really was. Attempts to achieve some consensus on wage differen- 
tials through elaborate job evaluation schemes have not been very successful. 
Solidarity wage policy from the late 1960s up to 1983 has therefore to a large 
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The wage-bargaining process during the period 1956-83 took place at three 
levels:  a central framework  agreement  between  LO and SAF (or PTK  and 
SAF), a number of national industry negotiations, followed by local negotia- 
tions at the plant level. There have been sixteen central LO-SAF agreements 
between 1956 and 1983, with contract lengths of one, two, or three years. De- 
spite this centralized bargaining structure, “wage drift” has been a pervasive 
phenomenon. For example, wage drift among private-sector blue-collar work- 
ers-conventionally  measured as the difference between actual wage increases 
and wage increases agreed on at the industry level-has  on average accounted 
for close to 50 percent of total wage increases. 
The egalitarian ambitions of the wage policy were manifested in the central 
LO-SAF agreements, but similar egalitarian ambitions seem to have dominated 
among white-collar unions within TCO. The frame agreements typically in- 
cluded a common  wage  increase  specified in  absolute terms (Swedish ore) 
rather than as a percentage. Other ingredients were special low-wage provis- 
ions, wage-drift  guarantees  to compensate workers  without wage  drift, and 
cost-of-living adjustments. It was possible to implement deviations from the 
frame agreement’s distribution profile at the industry-level  negotiations, but 
only if the parties could agree. The distribution rules in the frame agreement 
became binding if  the parties  at the industry  level failed to agree on other 
distribution plans. 
The pay compression face of solidarity wage policy has been caricatured as 
equivalent to “equal pay for all work.” This is certainly an exaggeration, but 
the radical egalitarianism of the wage policy  is one factor that has been put 
forward to explain the ultimate breakdown of centralized wage bargaining in 
Sweden. The employers’ organization in the engineering industry (Verkstads- 
foreningen) had for years been critical of the central negotiations, arguing that 
the frame agreements  allowed too little flexibility  at the  industry and local 
levels. Verkstadsforeningen  and other critics of wage equalization argued in 
favor of pay systems that would allow higher remuneration of skilled workers. 
The turning point came in 1983, when Verkstadsforeningen  was able to side- 
step LO and SAF and negotiate a separate agreement with the metalworkers’ 
union. The wage negotiations after 1983  have primarily involved industry-level 
rather  than  national  bargaining,  although  three  notional  central  frame 
agreements were struck during the second half of the 1980s. 
The period  1991-93  is a special case, entailing government-promoted vol- 
untary incomes policies in conjunction with a sharp disinflation policy. Despite 
all the noise that SAF had made about the costs of central negotiations, the 
organization was quite anxious to follow suit when the government called for 
coordinated national efforts to achieve deceleration of wage inflation. The de- 
gree of coordination in the wage rounds of the early 1990s has been extreme, 
involving virtually all employer organizations and most of the unions. 
There is a common presumption that the period 1991-93  is an interlude that 
will be followed by something similar to the industry-level negotiations that 313  The Swedish Wage Structure 
took place in the wake of the breakdown of centralization in 1983. The exact 
shape of  Sweden’s future wage-bargaining system is, however, very much an 
open question. SAF seems to have ambitions to prevent any return to the old 
system of nationwide coordination, and some employer representatives argue 
in favor of decentralization all the way down to the firm and plant levels. On 
the union side, there are signs of  emerging cooperation between blue-collar 
and white-collar workers, a development that may be unavoidable as the sharp 
borderlines between traditional blue- and white-collar jobs begin to disappear. 
9.2  Changes in the Swedish Wage Structure 
9.2.1  Basic Facts 
Sweden has experienced dramatic changes in its wage structure over the 
past three decades. Data from a variety of sources indicate that substantial pay 
compression took place from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. As in many 
other countries, this trend was reversed from around 1980-85  on; the data at 
hand show a modest increase in the dispersion of wages and salaries during 
the second half of the 1980s and up to the early 1990~~ 
Table 9.1 displays the standard deviation of  log hourly earnings from two 
representative  samples of  the Swedish population  (see Eriksson  and Aberg 
1987; and Klevmarken and Olofsson  1993). For  1968, 1974, and  1981, we 
have data from the Level of Living Survey (LNU); for 1984, 1986, 1988, and 
1991, we use the Household Market and Nonmarket Activities Survey (HUS). 
We have restricted the samples to eighteen- to sixty-five-year-old employees 
(excluding the self-employed). The three LNU samples and HUS 1984  are con- 
structed in an identical fashion. The later HUS samples are somewhat different. 
This is due to the household panel construction of HUS.3 The earnings data 
from LNU and HUS are comparable in the sense that they are measured in 
essentially the same way. Respondents are asked to report, among other things, 
current (before-tax) wage or salary as well as normal hours of work; hourly 
earnings for those who are not paid on an hourly basis are calculated as the 
ratio between weekly (monthly) pay and hours worked. These two surveys are 
our main data sources for the analysis in this section. 
2. The trend decline in wage dispersion has been discussed by, among others, Bjorklund (1986, 
1987), Jonsson and Siven (1986), and Hibbs (1990). The development during the late 1980s  is less 
well documented, an exception being Hibbs (1990). 
3. The 1984 sample was reinterviewed in the later surveys. New individuals have been added to 
the sample through an additional sample in  1986 and through interviews with young individuals 
leaving their parents and new adult members of existing households in 1986 and 1991. For these 
new individuals we construct the independent variables in the same way as above. For the panel 
samples of HUS 1986, 1988, and 1991, however, we have information only on events taking place 
between the surveys. Since we did not have access to spells of  employment for the 1991 sample 
or to changes in educational attainment as formulated above, we constructed these variables in a 
different way. For experience we used the initial values and assumed that the individual had been 
working until the survey in question. For education we used the initial level of education. 314  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
Table 9.1  The Swedish Wage Dispersion, 1968-91  (standard deviation of log hourly 
earnings) 
1968  1974  1981  1984  1986  1988  1991 
LNU  ,456  ,359  .311  ...  ...  ...  ... 
HUS  ...  ...  ...  .305  ,341  ,368  ,356 
(1,637)  (1,854)  (1,561)  (1,365) 
HINK  ...  ...  .406  .343  .365  ,391  ,383’ 
(1,ooO)  (1,004)  (1,889)  (1,779)  (1,746) 
(2,957)  (3,009)  (3,431) 
Nore: The number of observations is given in parentheses. The samples cover 18-65-year-olds. excluding 
the self-employed. The HINK samples refer to individuals with no  income from the public social insur- 
ance system (FGrsiikringskussun). 
aRefers to 1990. 
The picture that emerges from table 9.1 is quite striking. Between 1968 and 
1981, we observe a decrease in the standard deviation of log hourly earnings 
of 32 percent (from .46 to .31). From 1984 to 1991, there is instead an increase 
in the dispersion by  about 17 percent. Most of  this increase seems to have 
occurred between 1984 and 1986. The dispersion in the early 1990s is of the 
same order of  magnitude as the dispersion in the middle of  the 1970s. This 
general pattern is confirmed by  annual data from the Household Income Sur- 
vey  (HINK), 1981-90,  reported in the bottom row of table 9.1. The earnings 
data in this survey are based on annual labor income, obtained from tax returns, 
divided by  annual hours of  work, as reported in a complementary survey? 
These figures suggest that the drop in wage dispersion between 1981 and 1984 
may be understated in the LNU-HUS comparison. The development after 1984 
is very similar in the HINK and HUS samples, however. 
Alternative measures of changes in wage dispersion are presented in figure 
9.1 in terms of log wage differentials between different percentiles of the wage 
distribution. We  report the log(P90/PlO), where Pi  is percentile i.  The overall 
pattern of changes is the same as in table 9.1, with a substantial wage compres- 
sion until the early 1980s and a tendency toward increasing wage dispersion 
thereafter. Decomposing the 90-10 differential into a 90-50 and a 50-10 differ- 
ential illustrates that wage compression occurred at both the top and the bottom 
of  the wage distribution. The wage dispersion is higher at the top, however. 
Furthermore, the 75-25 wage differential shows that the changes that we ob- 
serve are not confined to the tails of the distribution. 
The overall measures of  wage dispersion reported here reveal that overall 
wage inequality in Sweden is small when viewed from an international per- 
spective (see Davis 1992). Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower (chap. 1 in this 
4. Unfortunately, the earnings data also include sick pay and some other social insurance pay- 
ments; it is possible to deduct these payments in a direct way only after 1985. 315  The Swedish Wage Structure 
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Fig. 9.1  Log wage differentials, 1968-91 
Source: LNU and HUS. 
volume) report that the 90-10  log wage differential for U.S. males was 1.36 in 
1984.  The corresponding figure for Sweden was 0.68 (0.66 including females). 
Thus, according to this measure, wage dispersion was about twice as high in 
the United States as in Sweden in  1984. The Swedish figure was also much 
lower than those for the other three countries examined in the Katz, Loveman, 
and  Blanchflower  study, namely,  Britain  (1.04), France  (1.18), and  Japan 
(1.02). 
The general pattern of changes in wage dispersion in LNU and HUS, shown 
in table 9.1 and figure 9.1, is confirmed by statistics on wages and salaries 
obtained from SAE5  The data at our disposal are in the form P90/P10 or P75/ 
P25. Data on individual hourly wages for blue-collar workers in the private 
sector are available since 1970. The message from figure 9.2 is clear; there is 
a fall in the wage dispersion by  15 percent between 1970 and 1983, followed 
by a rise of 6 percent from 1983 to 1990. The 90-10  wage differential in the 
early 1990s is of the same order of magnitude as the corresponding ratio in the 
mid- 1970s. 
Data on individual salaries for full-time, private-sector, white-collar workers 
are available since the late 1950s. Figure 9.3 reveals a pronounced pay com- 
pression during most of the 1960s and the 1970s, followed by an increase in 
the dispersion during the 1980s. Pay compression has been particularly strong 
5.  These data cover all workers whose employers are members of SAF. We are grateful to Doug- 
las Hibbs and Hikan Locking for providing data on blue-collar workers and to Birgitta Preussner, 
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Fig. 9.3  Log wage differentials for private-sector  white-collar workers, males 
and females, 1956-90 
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for female workers. Note that both figure 9.2 above and figure 9.3 show that 
wage compression started to lose its edge in the late 1970s and that the mini- 
mum wage dispersion occurs earlier than was implied by table 9.1 above. 
Public-sector employees have also experienced widening wage differentials 
from the mid-l980s,  again a clear reversal of the trends that prevailed during 
the 1970s and the early 1980s (see Statistics Sweden 1987, 1991). The 90-10 
ratio for central government employees fell by some 20 percent between 1973 
and 1985 and has increased during the second half of the 1980s. The data for 
local government employees show a similar picture. Computations based on 
LNU from 1974 and 1981 shown in Zetterberg (1988) reveal a decrease in the 
standard deviation of log wages by over 20 percent between 1974 and 1981 for 
local government employees; the corresponding change for central government 
employees was 16 percent. The period after 1984 involves a gradual increase 
in the 90-10  ratio for white-collar local government employees organized in 
TCO and SAC0 (Statistics Sweden 1991). The development in wage disper- 
sions for blue-collar  workers in the  local public  sector is more erratic, but 
the general trend is clearly consistent with the basic patterns for other groups 
(Statistics Sweden 1991). 
9.2.2 
In this section, we use the LNU and HUS micro data to investigate changes 
in the wage dispersion over the period 1968-91. We are interested in the extent 
to which changes in productive characteristics and changes in returns to these 
characteristics  can account for the observed changes in wage dispersion. A 
similar exercise using the first four of our samples (LNU 1968, 1974, and 1981 
and HUS 1984) is found in Bjorklund (1987); consequently, he dealt with the 
decline in wage dispersion. Hibbs (1990) used the first five of the samples to 
investigate whether changes in measured human capital characteristics could 
explain  the  changing  wage  dispersion  among  LO workers.  He found that 
changes in human capital variance were much smaller than changes in eam- 
ings variance. 
To address the question of  changes in wage dispersion, we start by estimat- 
ing simple human capital-type  wage equations for each sample. We regress 
the log of  hourly earnings on gender, a quadratic in experience, and years of 
schooling. The construction of  hourly earnings is described above. Years of 
work experience is obtained from a direct question. Schooling is represented 
by dummy variables for each year of schooling above nine years, which corre- 
sponds to the compulsory schooling limit of the current system. (The schooling 
variable is truncated at eighteen years.  j This choice was dictated by differences 
in the definition of schooling degrees obtained across the two surveys.6 
Accounting for Changes in Wage Dispersion 
6. The difference is in the definition of  a university degree. The LNU samples apply a more 
strict definition of a university degree and do not include some degrees from the new Hiigskola, 
which were given university status in 1977. These degrees are counted in the HUS samples. 318  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
Table 9.2  Estimated Wage Equations 
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Nore: Standard errors are in parentheses. 18-65-year-olds excluding the self-employed. The 1968, 1974, 
and 1981 results refer to the LNU sample, and 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1991 are from the HUS sample. 
Definitions of the variables are given in the text. 
Table 9.2 shows the estimates for the seven samples. We see that the absolute 
values of the estimated coefficients decrease in most cases between 1968 and 
1984. This is consistent with the strong tendencies toward wage compression 
during this period. The gender wage differential is almost halved during this 
period, the experience profiles become much more flat, and the returns to edu- 
cation fall. The picture after 1984 is much less clear-cut. There are some tend- 
encies toward increasing differentials, but these changes are relatively small. 
Note also that the explanatory power of the wage equation, measured in terms 
of  RZ,  falls markedly  after  1984. It is also worth noting that  the  standard 319  The Swedish Wage Structure 
deviation of  the residual follows the same time pattern as overall wage dis- 
persion.’ 
Before turning to a decomposition of the overall changes in wage dispersion, 
we take a closer look at wage differentials by education and age. These dimen- 
sions of  wage inequality will receive additional attention in subsequent sec- 
tions.  Figure  9.4 shows  the  returns  to  higher  education  in  terms  of  the 
university-gymnasium (college-high  school) log wage premium, calculated 
from table 9.2 above as the wage differential between workers with sixteen 
and twelve years of education. Our estimated wage equations imply dramatic 
changes in the returns to education. The estimates show a sharp decrease in 
the return to a university degree between 1968 and 1974 and a continued fall 
until 1984; after 1984 there is a slight recovery. A similar pattern is found if 
the model is estimated with dummies for education levels instead of dummies 
for years of schooling.*  We also plot the university-gymnasium wage differen- 
tial from another data source. This series refers to monthly salaries for male, 
full-time, white-collar workers in mining, manufacturing, and construction. 
This series confirms the basic pattern from our wage equations. Using the wage 
difference between fifteen and twelve years of schooling from table 9.2 above 
as our measure of the university wage premium, we obtain a series that closely 
follows the “manufacturing” data. 
Table 9.2  also revealed a substantial flattening of  the experience-earnings 
profile. This profile is of  course closely related to the age-earnings profile. 
Table 9.3 reports some results from estimations of wage equations where the 
experience variables are replaced by  age dummies. The table gives the esti- 
mated log wage differentials for different groups, along with the corresponding 
wage ratio, relative to prime-age workers (aged thirty-five to forty-four years). 
The relative wage of  eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds increased dramatically 
from about 55 percent of  prime-age wages in  1968 to almost 80 percent in 
1986. After 1986 there is a moderate drop in the relative wage of eighteen- to 
nineteen-year-olds by about 6 percentage points. The relative wage of twenty- 
to twenty-four-year-olds  has been much more stable around 80 percent, with a 
minor increase between 1968 and 1974. 
To what extent can changes in productive characteristics and changes in re- 
turns to these characteristics account for the observed changes in wage disper- 
sion? In table 9.4, we use the estimated equations in table 9.2 above to generate 
7. One might argue that changes in the wage structure should be more visible for workers who 
have recently entered the labor market. Therefore, we have estimated similar wage equations for 
workers  twenty-five to thirty-four years old. These estimates show a similar development over 
time, but the estimates are in general much less precise, especially in  1986, 1988, and 1991. (The 
estimates are available from the authors on request.) 
8. As a check for quality changes among university graduates, we estimated the seven wage 
equations separately for the cohort aged twenty-five to thirty-four years in 1968. These estimates 
show the same basic patterns as the full samples, thus providing no evidence for substantial qual- 
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Fig. 9.4  University-gymnasium  log wage differentials, 1967-91 
Sources: Calculations based on table 9.2 (16 vs. 12 years of education) and Statistics Sweden. 
the dispersion in predicted wages. The first panel shows that changes in the 
characteristics of the samples, weighted by the 1968  wage equation, are unable 
to account for the changing pattern of wage dispersion over time. If anything, 
the changes in sample characteristics would have produced  increasing wage 
dispersion between  1968 and 1984, that is, during the period when the actual 
wage dispersion was dramatically reduced. In the second panel, we find that 
the changing returns to different characteristics produce a strong trend decline 
in dispersion (using Characteristics of the 1968 sample as  weight^).^ The stan- 
dard deviation of predicted log wages falls from 0.29 in 1968 to 0.16 in 1981 
and stays roughly constant thereafter. This decrease corresponds to almost 88 
percent of the overall decrease in wage dispersion between 1968 and 1981 of 
14.5 log points.Io 
In conclusion, then, we have shown that the substantial pay compression that 
took place during the  1960s and  1970s has been partly reversed during the 
second half of the 1980s. Wage compression in the earlier period was mainly 
due to  decreasing dispersion  between  gender-experience-education  groups, 
while the recent increase in dispersion has to a larger extent taken place within 
9. The results are qualitatively the same if we use the 1991 characteristics and wage equations 
as weights. 
10. A similar pattern is found for the young worker sample, with more than a 50 percent de- 
crease in wage dispersion from 1968 (0.231) to 1981 (0.108). Also in this case we see a break in 
the trend after 1981; in fact, there is an increase in the standard deviation of predicted log wages 
during the 1980s. The predicted wage dispersion of young workers is almost as high in 1991 as in 
1974 if we use the 1968 sample as weights. However, given the small number of observations (and 
low precision) in the young worker sample, these figures should be intetpreted with caution. 321  The Swedish Wage Structure 
groups. We have also shown that the earnings of young workers rose dramati- 
cally until the mid-1980s and that the return to higher education has changed 
sharply over time, closely mimicking the trends in overall wage dispersion. 
9.3  Alternative Explanations 
9.3.1  Demand and Supply Factors 
Why have wage differentials in Sweden been reduced from the mid- 1960s 
up to the early 1980s, and why are they widening from the mid-l980s? We 
Table 9.3  Youth Wage Differentials (vs. 35-44 years) 
18-19  20-24  25-34 
ri  Ratio  ri  Ratio  B  Ratio 
1968  -  ,605  ,546  -  ,274  .760  -  ,073  ,930 
(.035)  (.023)  (.020) 
1974  -  ,575  .563  -  .224  .799  -  ,070  ,932 
(.032)  (.020)  (.015) 
1981  -  ,396  .673  -.I99  ,820  -.lo5  ,900 
(.031)  (.017)  (.013) 
1984  -  ,406  .663  -.220  302  -.I21  ,886 
(.07  1 )  (.026)  (.017) 
1986  -  ,229  ,795  -.221  ,802  -  ,052  ,949 
(.056)  (.030)  (.020) 
1988  -  ,272  ,762  -.I86  ,830  -  ,093  ,911 
(.059)  (.036)  (.023) 
1991  -  ,303  ,738  -.215  306  -  ,077  ,926 
(.087)  (.028) 
Note: The estimates are based on wage equations with dummies for education, gender, and age 
(18-19,  20-24,  25-34,  45-54,  55-65).  Ratio is the relative wage calculated as exp(p). Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
Table 9.4  Standard Deviation of Predicted Log Wages 
Note: The left panel shows the standard deviation of predicted log wages using the 1968 estimates 
for all samples, while the right panel shows the standard deviation when  estimates for different 
years are applied to the 1968 sample. 322  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
begin our investigation by examining how far conventional demand and supply 
factors can explain movements in wage differentials by education and age. We 
make use of a variety of data sources that provide time-series variation in rela- 
tive  wages  as well  as potential  explanatory  variables,  including  the  seven 
micro-data sets that were used in the previous section. 
A  simple theoretical  framework is illustrated  in figure 9.5. Consider two 
types of workers, for example, young (y) and adult (a)  workers. The number 
of potential labor force participants in the two categories is denoted Ly  and Lo, 
respectively. Effective  supply is lower than potential  supply because  of fric- 
tional unemployment and other kinds of nonparticipation. Let effective supply 
be given as N, = vL,W ,”  and N, = FL,W J, where W, and  Wa are real-wage 
rates. Effective relative supply  is then obtained as  NJNo = (v/p,)(LJLJ(  W,/Wa)”. 
As drawn, the figure implies q = 0. The downward-sloping curve represents a 
relative demand schedule that is compatible with a production function of the 
CES variety. Equilibrium obtains where relative demand (DJ  equals effective 
relative supply (S,). 
Suppose that wages are flexible,  and consider an increase in the potential 
relative supply of young workers. If the effective relative supply is independent 
of the relative wage, as implied by figure 9.5, we obtain a relative wage re- 
sponse to the increase in relative supply as given by the elasticity -  l/u, where 
u is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between young and adult workers. 
The relative employment response is in this case equal to one, implying that 
Fig. 9.5  The determination of relative wages 323  The Swedish Wage Structure 
employment-to-labor  force ratios remain constant. These wage and employ- 
ment responses are modified  when the relative  supply depends on the rela- 
tive wage. Suppose that the effective relative  supply is wage elastic, with q 
denoting the (constant) elasticity. The market-clearing  wage response to an 
exogenous  increase  in  the  potential  supply  is  then  given  by  the  elasticity 
-  l/(a + q), whereas the employment elasticity is given as a/(a + q). 
We apply this simple framework to an analysis of wage differentials by edu- 
cation and age categories. The key exogenous variable on the supply side is 
potential  relative supply. We take relative labor force shares as exogenous in 
the analysis of education wage differentials. (The results are almost identical 
if relative population shares are used instead of  relative labor force shares.) 
Participation decisions among youths are, however, sensitive to labor market 
conditions and schooling opportunities, so relative labor force shares may fail 
to be exogenous with respect to relative wages. Relative population shares are 
therefore taken as exogenous in the analysis of age-earnings differentials. 
Educational  Wage Differentials 
We have documented a substantial fall and a subsequent partial rebound of 
the university wage premium,  that is, the relative wage differential between 
university and high school graduates. Movements in the university wage pre- 
mium can usefully be interpreted as the outcome of shifts in the relative supply 
of and relative demand for highly educated workers or-to  use the terminol- 
ogy of Tinbergen  (1975)-the  “race” between education and technology. To 
the extent that market forces have been of importance in forming the Swedish 
wage structure, the market for university graduates should have been particu- 
larly responsive. The direct influence of union egalitarianism has most likely 
been least pervasive at the upper end of the wage distribution. 
There is a common presumption  that technological progress is associated 
with a steady increase in the relative demand for highly educated labor. Direct 
evidence on this  matter  is meager,  however. We  have confined ourselves to 
examining the role of  sectoral shifts in employment by making use of simple 
“fixed manpower requirements” models. (For similar applications, see Free- 
man 1980; and Katz and Murphy 1992.) The two data sets at hand are far from 
ideal, but they both tell a similar story. One data set is based on the labor force 
surveys and captures the whole economy but has little industrial detail (only 
seven sectors including the public sector). The other data set describes mining 
and manufacturing, with a disaggregation into forty-four industries. Education 
by sector data are available in the labor force surveys from 1971 on; for mining 
and manufacturing we have education by industry data for 1970 and 1985. We 
use four education categories: (i) primary education (education levels below 
gymnasium);  (ii) secondary education  (gymnasium one to three years);  (iii) 
some university (one to two years); and (iv) university (three years or more). 
The basic formula yielding the relative demand for education category k  at 
time t is 324  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
where Nj is employment in sector j,  N is total employment, and ay = Nkj/Nj  is 
the fixed labor skill coefficient calculated as the ratio of the number of workers 
in education k and industry j  to total employment in industry j. For mining 
and manufacturing we compute the labor skill coefficients as averages of the 
coefficients for 1970 and 1985. For the whole economy we make use of three 
years-  197  1, 1984, and 1991-to  obtain measures of skill coefficients. 
The  results  of  these  computations,  expressed  as annualized  percentage 
changes, are displayed in table 9.5. The basic pattern is that the relative demand 
for highly educated workers grows at a slower pace during the late 1980s than 
during the 1970s and the early 1980s. This pattern differs from what has been 
observed in Britain and the United States, where skill-biased demand shifts are 
of  the same order of  magnitude in the  1980s as in the  1970s (see Katz and 
Murphy 1992; and Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower, chap. 1 in this volume). 
Our results thus suggest that sectoral shifts offer little help in explaining the 
observed movements in the university wage premium. Measured changes in 
the allocation of labor among industries seem to have been less favorable to 
more educated workers during the period of rising returns to university educa- 
tion. This is clearly inconsistent with a simple demand-side explanation of the 
changes in the university wage premium. 
Turning next to the supply side, two distinct patterns in the data are required 
in order to explain observed movements in the wage differentials (absent obvi- 
ous explanatory power from the demand side). There must be a trend increase 
in  the  relative  supply  of  highly  educated  workers  during  a period  lasting 
roughly from the 1960s to the early 1980s; the sharp fall in the university wage 
premium  would  otherwise  be  difficult  to  explain  by  conventional  market 
forces. There must also be a pronounced deceleration in this relative supply 
growth in order to explain the rebound of the returns to higher education since 
the mid-1980s. In fact, both these patterns do appear in the data. 
Table 9.5  Demand Shift Indices, 1970-91 
Mining and 
Manufacturing  All Industries 
(44 sectors)  (7 sectors) 
1970-84  1984-90  197 1-84  1984-9 1 
Primary education  -.18  p.01  -  .56  -  .32 
Secondary education  .20  .04  .05  .I4 
Some university (1-2  years)  .6 1  -  .01  1.13  .36 
University (3 years or more)  .83  -  .22  1.44  .43 
Sources: Own computations based on eq. (I) using unpublished tables from Statistics Sweden 
(mining and manufacturing) and the labor force surveys (all industries). The table shows annu- 
alized percentage changes in relative demand. 325  The Swedish Wage Structure 
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Figure 9.6 displays the labor force shares of three main categories of educa- 
tion-primary,  secondary, and higher education-over  the period  197  1-9  1. 
The period is clearly characterized by a steady increase in the level of educa- 
tion. Those with only primary education constitute less than 30 percent of the 
labor force in the early 1990s. The fraction with higher (at least some univer- 
sity) education has more than doubled since the early 1970s. 
A closer look at the relative supply changes is provided by  table 9.6 and 
figure 9.7. The labor force share of university graduates (with university educa- 
tion for at least three years) has increased steadily up  to the mid-1980s; the 
share stays roughly constant, however, during the second half of the 1980s and 
up to the early 1990s. 
The decline and subsequent rebound of the university wage premium thus 
seems consistent with a simple explanation emphasizing relative supply move- 
ments. The ratio between the number of labor force participants with a univer- 
sity degree and the number with (three years of) gymnasium stood at 0.48 in 
1971 and reached 0.90 in the mid-1980s; by  1991 the ratio had declined to 
0.80. The university wage premium, obtained from the estimated wage equa- 
tions in table 9.2 above, is negatively correlated with the relative supply of 
university graduates. The negative relation between relative wages and relative 
supplies appears consistent with a simple model with stable relative demand 
and fluctuating relative supply. There are only seven data points, however, and 
one would like to see corroborating evidence from other sources. This leads us 
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Fig. 9.6  Education in the Swedish labor force, 1971-91 
Source: The labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 326  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
Table 9.6  Relative Supply Changes by Education, 1972-91 
1972-74  1975-80  1981-84  1985-91  1972-91 
Primary 
Some gymnasium (1-2 
years) 
( 
Gymnasium (3 years) 
Some university (1-2  years) 
University (3 years or more) 
-.39 
(- .67) 
-  .47 
1-2.19) 
.20 













































Source: The labor force SUNeYS, Statistics Sweden. 
Note: The figures are mean annual changes of labor force shares, multiplied by  100; the parenthe- 
ses show mean annual changes of log shares, multiplied by  100. 
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Fig. 9.7  University education in the Swedish labor force, 1971-91 
Source: The labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
to an examination of movements in the university wage premium within Swed- 
ish industry (mining, manufacturing, and construction). 
Statistics on private-sector, white-collar workers' salaries, disaggregated by 
education, are available in official statistics from the late 1960s (see fig. 9.4 
above). There is a pronounced decline in the university wage premium from 
the late 1960s to the early 1980s followed by a rise in the late 1980s, similar 327  The Swedish Wage Structure 
to the pattern found in our micro data. We  take the private-sector university 
wage premium as a proxy for the corresponding economy-wide differential 
and apply the simple relative demand-relative  supply framework, including a 
time trend to allow for shifts in relative demand. Table 9.7 displays the regres- 
sion results. The simple model is remarkably successful in explaining the rela- 
tive wage movements. The estimated elasticity with respect to relative supply 
in column 2 suggests an elasticity of  substitution between university and high 
school graduates of  2.9 (assuming wage-inelastic relative supply). Available 
evidence from other  countries suggests elasticities of  substitution between 
highly educated and less educated workers of between one and two (see Free- 
man 1986). It is noteworthy that the regressions in the last two columns, based 
on only seven data points, produce estimates of the relative supply effect that 
are of a similar order of magnitude. The positive trend coefficients in columns 
2  and  3  suggest that  secular demand shifts have  favored highly  educated 
workers. 
Youth Relative Wages 
Our estimated wage equations have revealed a substantial fall in the returns 
to  experience from the late  1960s. This has  implied rising relative wages 
Table 9.7  The University Wage Premium  and Relative Supply: Dependent 
Variable, In(WJW,) 
All Sectors (68,74,  81, 84, 86,  88, 
Industry  91) 
197 1-90 
1972-90  16-12 Years  I 5-1 2 Years 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  .179 
(1  3.40) 
MLJL,)  -.143 
(4.16) 
ln(LJL,)-  I 
Time 
R2  .462 
SE  .03 1 
D-W  .49 
,024 
(.73) 







-  .026  ,144  ,124 
~72)  (4.50)  (7.08) 
-  .25 1  -  ,429  -  ,259 





,790  ,842  ,865 
,018  .055  ,030 
2.35 
Note:  Absolute r-values are in parentheses. The dependent variable in cols. 1-3  is the university/ 
gymnasium log wage  differential among male white-collar workers in mining, manufacturing, 
and construction. The dependent variables in the last two columns are the estimated university/ 
gymnasium log wage differentials obtained from table 9.2,  16 vs.  12 years and 15 vs. 12 years of 
schooling. Lg(L,)  is the number of  labor force participants with university (gymnasium) education. 
The relative supply figure for 1968 is imputed by using the figure for 1971 and assuming that the 
change in LJL,  over the period  1968-71  is the same as the observed change over the period 
1971-74. 328  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
among youths in the labor market,  as is evident from table 9.3 above. The 
relative wage improvement is particularly striking for teenagers; the wage of 
eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds relative to thirty-five- to forty-four-year-olds 
rose from 55 percent in 1968 to 80 percent in 1986, with some decline over 
the following years. 
To what extent can these movements in youth relative wages be explained 
by relative supply changes, assuming smooth and possibly nonneutral demand 
shifts? The youth labor market in postwar Sweden, as well as in many other 
countries, has been exposed to substantial demographic shocks (cf. Freeman 
and Bloom  1986). The timing of  the baby boomers’ impact is illustrated  in 
figure 9.8 by the number of eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds. The size of  this 
age group peaked in the mid-1960s and decreased substantially between 1965 
and 1980. The second wave of large youth cohorts entered the labor market in 
the mid-l980s, and there are noticeable fluctuations in the number of youths 
over the late 1980s and up to 199  1. 
The marked fluctuations in the size of the youth cohorts translate into sub- 
stantial changes in relative population ratios. The period of rising youth relative 
wages coincides with a trend decline in the relative youth population. The ratio 
of eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds relative to thirty-five- to forty-four-year-olds 
declined from .25 to .19 over the period 1968-86. By regressing the estimated 
log wage differentials in table 9.3 on the corresponding log relative population 
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Fig. 9.8  The number of 18-19-year-olds in the population, 1963-91 
Source; The labor force surveys,  Statistics Sweden. 329  The Swedish Wage Structure 
cient on the relative supply variable of -0.96  with a t-value of 6.2. For twenty- 
to twenty-four-year-olds the corresponding relative supply elasticity is -0.12 
with a r-value of  2.5. These estimates have the reasonable implication  that 
twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds are closer substitutes to prime-age workers 
than eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds are. The results are encouraging and sug- 
gest that explorations of other data sources may be worthwhile. 
We make use of time series on youth relative wages in mining and manufac- 
turing over the period 1970-88.”  In these data, youths are identified as those 
aged eighteen to twenty-four, whereas  adults are those aged twenty-five to 
forty-nine. Table 9.8 presents the results of simple models with only two ex- 
planatory variables; the population ratios capture relative supply, and the trend 
captures everything else with a trend component, including relative quality 
changes and nonneutral demand shifts. For three of the four groups we obtain 
sizable negative estimates of the relative supply effect. The exception is young 
female blue-collar  workers, whose relative wages have shown a continuous 
upward trend over the whole period. 
Our examination of wage differentials by  age thus leads to the same basic 
conclusion  as the  analysis  of  educational wage differentials: relative  wage 
fluctuations seem to be driven by  fluctuations in relative supply. It is clear, 
however, that the estimated models have been extremely simple and allowed 
only for “own effects” in the quantity-to-wage link. This means that the partic- 
ular estimates are unlikely to survive a more elaborate modeling of factor de- 
mand  systems. The magnitudes of  the estimated  relative  supply effects are 
plausible, however, and usually not very different from estimates obtained in 
other studies. 
Gender Wage Diferentials 
From  1968 to  1981 we also observe a remarkable increase in the relative 
wage of females. This has occurred simultaneously with a large increase in the 
female labor supply (table 9.9). After 1981 the gender wage gap has been more 
or less stable at the same time as the growth of  female relative supply has 
gone down. There are several factors that may help explain these movements 
in relative wages and relative supply, such as the abolishment of separate fe- 
male wage scales by SAF and LO in the early 1960s, the introduction of sepa- 
rate taxation for spouses between 1965 and 1971, the changing rules and bene- 
fits for maternity leave, and the increasing supply of public day care. We will 
not go into details about the possible explanations, however. It will be suffi- 
cient here to highlight one factor, namely, demand. Applying the fixed man- 
power requirements  model, and calculating the relative demand for females 
for the whole economy (using seven sectors), we get the demand changes re- 
ported in table 9.9. Measured relative demand for females increased sharply 
between 1968 and 1981. During the 198Os, in contrast, we find no changes in 
11. We are grateful to Per Skedinger for providing these data. For details, see Skedinger (1990). 330  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
Table 9.8  Youth Relative Wages and Relative Population Ratios (18-24  vs. 
2549  years), 1970-88: Dependent Variable, ln(W,I W,) 
Blue-Collar Workers  White-Collar Workers 
Males  Males  Females 
Females 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
~~ 
Constant  -.397  -SO7  -.I24  -.805  -.778  -.763  -.801 
(9.95)  (3.25)  (3.45)  (10.34)  (4.47)  (10.61)  (6.32) 
In(Pv/PJ  -.201  -.291  -.028  -.241  -.215  -.378  -.407 
(5.71)  (2.28)  (39)  (3.52)  (1.47)  (5.97)  (3.78) 
Time  ,003  ,003  ,002  .002  ,003  -.0009  -.0008 
82  ,945  ,947  .788  311  .819  ,760  ,745 
SE  ,007  .006  ,006  ,014  ,012  .012  .012 
D-W  1.03  1.95  1.44  1.02  1.47  1.24  1.82 
AR(1)  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
(6.99)  (3.42)  (4.91)  (2.91)  (2.09)  (1.15)  ~72) 
Nore: For details on the wage variables, which refer to mining and manufacturing, see Skedinger 
(1990). The population series refer to both males and females and are obtained from the labor 
force surveys. Absolute r-values are in parentheses. 
Table 9.9  Changes in Female Relative Wages, Relative Demand and Supply 
















.04  1 
Note:  A  In  (W,/Wm) is the change in the standardized female relative wage, as implied by  table 
9.2. A In D,  is the measured change in relative demand for female labor, applying eq. (1) to data 
from the labor  force  surveys, and using  the average weights (a,)  for  1968, 1981, and  1991. 
A In  (L,/L,) is the change in female/male shares of the labor force from the labor force surveys. 
relative demand. This development is partly driven by  the rapid  growth of 
public-sector employment during the  1970s and the subsequent deceleration 
of public-sector expansion during the 1980s. The demand pattern is strikingly 
similar to the relative wage pattern of females. Clearly, relative demand shifts 
for female labor is a factor that cannot be overlooked in an investigation of 
gender wage differentials in Sweden. 
9.3.2  Institutional Factors 
Egalitarianism became a pervasive ingredient of  LO’S solidarity wage bar- 
gaining from the mid-1960s through the 1970s. The policy was implemented 
through central framework agreements with low-wage provisions. TCO’s egali- 331  The Swedish Wage Structure 
tarian  ambitions were always less explicit than LO’S, but there is little doubt 
that the unions within TCO adhered to wage policies that were largely similar 
to those of LO. 
Wage bargaining within the LO-SAF area from 1956 to 1983 took place at 
three levels, namely, the national, the industry, and the local plant levels. The 
central frame agreement typically involved three components: (i) a common 
flat rate amount specified in ore; (ii) a wage-drift guarantee with the purpose 
of compensating workers who received no or only small pay rises in excess of 
the contractual increase; and (iii) a low-wage adjustment amount targeted at 
workers whose actual hourly wages were lower than a specified reference level 
(the low-wage boundary). In addition, cost-of-living adjustments, typically on 
a flat rate basis, were negotiated in some of the frame contracts. 
Hibbs (1990) has simulated the wage distribution implied by complete im- 
plementation of the frame agreement in the LO-SAF area. His main finding is 
that the trend decline in the actual dispersion from the early 1970s to the early 
1980s is closely tracked by the frame dispersion. The frame always implied a 
more compressed wage structure than the actual outcome, however; on aver- 
age, around 80 percent of the frame compression was achieved. Hibbs’s results 
are striking, but they give no information on whether the frame agreements 
were compatible  with the fundamental  demand  and  supply forces.  For ex- 
ample, we have seen that the market environment during the  1970s favored 
rising youth relative wages, which surely explains part of the decline in overall 
dispersion among LO workers. 
We have not attempted any detailed examination of  the sources of the re- 
duced wage dispersion among LO workers to ascertain to what extent the wage 
agreements have conformed to demand and supply factors. It seems implausi- 
ble, however, to rule out any independent role for egalitarian union wage poli- 
cies. Solidarity wage bargaining is closely linked to coordinated wage negotia- 
tions,  and  centralized  wage  negotiations  were  effectively  dismantled  from 
1983 on. If the changes in the wage-bargaining system are more substance than 
form, we should expect to find significant changes in wage behavior over the 
second half of the 1980s. 
We address the issue of institutional changes by offering a brief analysis of 
wage determination at the industry and regional levels. One issue is whether 
the breakdown of centralized wage bargaining has made industry wages more 
responsive  to  industry-specific  factors.  Earlier  work  has  indicated  that 
industry-specific factors such as output prices or productivity have a negligible 
effect on industry wages in Sweden (Holmlund and Zetterberg 1991; Forslund 
1992, 1994). If centralization matters, one would expect to see more scope for 
rent sharing as the system becomes more decentralized. 
We have estimated simple industry wage equations to explore whether sec- 
toral  variables become  more important after  1983. We make use of pooled 
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manufacturing, covering the period 1963-89.'2 The hourly wage rate pertains 
to blue-collar workers. The basic idea is to view the industry wage as shaped 
by a blend of industry-specific variables and general labor market variables as 
in studies by, among others, Blanchflower, Oswald, and Garrett (1989), Nickel1 
and Wadhwani (1990), Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), and Forslund (1992, 
1994). We  expect that the shift to more decentralized wage bargaining has 
increased the importance of the industry-specific variables, here captured by 
(lagged) profits per employee. The general labor market variables are captured 
by time dummies. 
Table 9.10 presents the results of estimations of error correction type speci- 
fications, where the change in the log wage rate of the industry (A In  W,,) is 
explained by the lagged dependent variable, the lagged wage level, as well as 
the lagged profit variable. The latter is defined as R,, = (VA,, -  WTJE,,,  where 
VA  is value added, WT is the total wage bill in the industry, and E is the total 
number of  employees. (WT and E include both blue- and white-collar work- 
ers.) The second column includes dummy interaction terms to test the hypothe- 
sis that sectoral variables have become more important as a result of the shift 
to industry bargaining. There is some evidence in favor of the hypothesis. The 
coefficient on the lagged profit variable is significantly larger during the period 
1983-89  than during the earlier years, suggesting an increasing albeit small 
role for rent sharing during the latter part of the 1980s. 
A  more  decentralized wage-bargaining system  may  also make  regional 
wages more responsive to regional labor market conditions. Some evidence on 
this matter can be obtained from a different data source pertaining to regional 
wages. We  use pooled cross-sectional and time-series data for twenty-four re- 
gions (liin)  over the period 1966-89  (see Jansson and Ostros 1991).  We  allow 
for regional fixed effects as well as time dummies. The major difference com- 
pared to the industry wage equations is that we include a measure of regional 
labor market tightness, the difference between the vacancy rate and the unem- 
ployment rate (V -  U) in the region (as a percentage of the labor force). Mea- 
sures of  firms'  performance are not available, however. Table 9. l l gives the 
results. Regional wages do respond to changes in tightness, but the effect is 
quantitatively small. There is no evidence that wages have become more re- 
sponsive after 1983, as is clear from column 2 in the table. 
The basic message that emerges from these analyses of  industry and re- 
gional wage behavior is that the changes in the wage-bargaining system have 
so far had only weak effects on wage behavior at the sectoral level. The effect 
that can be identified suggests an increasing role for rent sharing, as should 
be expected. 
One piece of evidence that may indicate that the wage policy has been im- 
portant is the behavior of residual wage dispersion. As was observed in connec- 
tion with table 9.2 above, residual dispersion followed a time pattern that was 
12. This is an updated version of  the data set used in Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991). 333  The Swedish Wage Structure 
Table 9.10  Industry Wage Equations, 1965-89  Dependent Variable, A In  W, 
In Y,-I  -  ,222 
(7.97) 
A In  W,,,-I  -  .27 1 
(7.01) 
(1.17) 
In R,,,-  I  ,005 















Note:  Absolute t-values are in parentheses. D8389 is a dummy for the period 1983-89. Full sets 
of time dummies and industry dummies are included. There are 700 observations. 
Table 9.11  Regional Wage Equations, 1966-89: Dependent Variable, A In  W, 
D8389 . A(V - W2,, 























Nofe: Absolute t-values are in parentheses. D8389 is a dummy for the period 1983-89. Full sets 
of time dummies and regional dummies are included. U  and Vare measured in percentages. There 
are 576 observations. 
similar to overall dispersion. We  do not have obvious candidates for supply 
shifts that can explain this fact. Other studies indicate that a substantial part of 
this decreasing within-group dispersion was associated with decreasing wage 
differentials between industries (Arai 199  1; Edin and Zetterberg 1992). 
9.4  The Performance of the Labor Market for Youths 
Economists and other observers have expected to see a deterioration in youth 
labor market performance as a response to institutionally driven increases in 
youth relative wages. Our analysis, however, suggests that movements in wage 
differentials by  age are largely consistent with a simple demand and supply 334  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
framework with flexible wages. The trend increase as well as the subsequent 
modest decline in youth relative wages can be accounted for by changes in the 
relative supply of  young workers. This view also implies that youth relative 
employment should adjust to changes in the relative size of the youth popula- 
tion. This section examines this hypothesis, along with other aspects of youth 
labor market performance. The evidence that emerges is somewhat mixed, but 
severe distortions are difficult to establish. 
We  have noted sharp increases in youth relative wages over the 1970s and 
the 1980s (see table 9.3 above). The relative wage increases have been particu- 
larly strong for eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds, whereas the relative wages of 
twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds have increased only modestly. If youth rela- 
tive wages can be explained by  demand and supply forces, we  should also 
expect youth relative employment shares to be highly responsive to movements 
in youth relative population shares. Youth relative employment should in fact 
be unit elastic with respect to relative population if  relative supply is wage 
inelastic. If  the youth labor market is characterized by  rigid relative wages, 
perhaps owing to negotiated minimum wages, we  should on the other hand 
expect only weak employment responses to population changes. These re- 
sponses should in that case be particularly weak among eighteen- to nineteen- 
year-olds as relative wage increases have been most dramatic for this group. 
Table 9.12 presents results of relative employment regressions of the form 
ln(N,/N,)  = a  + p ln(P,/PJ  + yU  + E, 
Table 9.12  Youth Relative Employment and Relative Population Ratios, 1%4-91: 
Dependent Variable, In(N,/N,) 
Males 18-19  Males 20-24  Females 18-19  Females 20-24 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Constant  -.675 
C99) 
In(P,lPJ  3.59 
(3.51) 
[.581 
U  -  ,065 
(4.37) 
Time 
R2  ,941 
SE  ,032 
D- W  2.3 1 
-348  -.469 
(1.61)  (8.05) 
,730  .768 
(3.28)  (19.47) 
[1.21]  [5.95] 
-.060  -.030 
(4.12)  (6.09) 
-  .007 
( 1.52) 
,944  ,986 
.03  1  .011 
2.15  1.32 





-  ,030 
(5.97) 
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Nore: All estimations allow for first-order autocorrelated errors. Absolute r-values are in parentheses and 
brackets; tests for coefficients equal to unity are in brackets. The unemployment rate (U) is measured 
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Table 9.13  The Youth Labor Market, 1968-91  (%) 
Unemployment Rate  Employment/Population 
Males  Females  Males  Females 
All, 16-64  18-19  20-24  18-19  20-24  18-19  20-24  18-19  20-24 
I968  2.2  5.8  3.0  4.6  3.0  62.4  75.3  61.3  61.7 
1974  2.0  4.3  2.1  7.4  3.2  64.9  78.5  60.6  68.3 
1981  2.5  7.6  4.8  9.9  4.7  62.1  79.5  62.2  78.8 
1984  3.1  5.0  6.2  3.9  6.6  57.3  77.1  61.8  74.8 
1986  2.7  4.2  6.3  4.1  6.2  58.6  76.4  61.5  75.8 
1988  1.6  2.3  3.3  3.3  3.4  60.8  81.4  64.5  78.0 
1991  2.7  7.5  6.7  6.8  5.8  53.0  71.2  59.1  73.8 
Source: The labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
Nore: The figures are not adjusted for the changes in measurement techniques introduced in 1987. 
where N,,INa is relative youthtadult employment, PJPa is relative population, 
and U is the aggregate unemployment rate. Po is represented by the number of 
twenty-five- to forty-nine-year-olds. If the labor market is competitive and rel- 
ative supply is wage inelastic, we expect p = 1. The alternative extreme case 
involves complete wage rigidity and p = 0. The unemployment rate is included 
to capture the possibility that the cyclic variability of  the ratio of effective to 
potential supply varies among age groups. 
The results displayed in table 9.12 show substantial employment respon- 
siveness to population changes. The point estimates of  p are typically lower 
than unity, but in most cases we cannot reject the hypothesis of complete em- 
ployment adjustment, that is, p = 1. The exception is male twenty- to twenty- 
four-year-olds.  There is no support for the hypothesis that teenage employment 
is particularly rigid with respect to population changes. 
There is, however, some evidence indicating a deterioration in youth labor 
market performance. From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s there is a trend 
increase in youth unemployment rates and also a trend increase in youth rela- 
tive to adult unemployment (tables 9.13 and 9.14). Youth participation in labor 
market programs has also increased, particularly during the mid- 1980s. For 
example, over 10 percent of  sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds were engaged in 
public employment programs in 1984. 
Employmentlpopulation ratios among sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds have 
shown a trend decline since the 1960s (table 9.14). This is mainly due to a 
rise in school enrollment, however. There is a strong trend increase in school 
enrollment among teenagers, reflecting in part an expansion of the senior high 
school to provide (usually two years of) vocational training. School enrollment 
among sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds-measured  as the number of full-time 
students as a percentage of the population-stood  at 30 percent in the mid- 336  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Hoimlund 
Table 9.14  Labor Market Activities and School Enrollment among 
1619-Year-Olds  (%) 
U  LFPR  NIP  SIP  RIP  MIP  (N+  S)lP  (N- R + S)/P 
1968  5.7  54.6  51.4  32.8  84.2 
1974  6.6  55.2  51.6  32.1  84.3 
1981  9.4  49.7  45.1  41.3  1.5  1.8  86.4  84.9 
1984  4.9  45.3  43.1  44.5  10.1  1.3  87.6  17.5 
1986  4.1  45.0  43.2  47.3  7.3  .I  90.5  83.2 
1988  3.1  47.3  45.9  49.3  4.0  .5  95.2  91.2 
1991  6.7  44.7  41.7  51.2  92.9 
Source: The labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden, and the Swedish Labor Market Board 
Note: U = unemployment rate; LFPR = labor force participation ratio; P  = population; N  = 
employment; S = school enrollment; R =relief jobs (including youth jobs and youth teams); M = 
manpower training (including vocational introduction programs); N is inclusive of R; and S is 
inclusive of M. 
1960s and had risen to 50 percent in the early 1990s. Column 7 of table 9.14 
shows that the fraction of  teenagers in employment or school has increased 
from 84 percent in 1968 to over 90 percent in the early 1990s. A similar picture 
emerges if  employment is confined to “regular” employment by  excluding 
workers in public employment programs (col. 8). 
The evidence on the performance of the youth labor market is thus mixed. 
There is some increase in youth relative unemployment and/or youth participa- 
tion in labor market programs. There is, however, also a trend rise in the pro- 
portion of teenagers engaged in “productive activities,” that is, an increase in 
the share engaged in employment or education. Rising school enrollment has 
made the labor force participants among teenagers an  increasingly selected 
group with relatively low educational attainment; this contributes to higher 
relative youth unemployment. Other institutional changes have worked in the 
same direction. There have, for example, been marked changes in the availabil- 
ity and levels of unemployment benefits; the Swedish unemployment insurance 
system was much more generous in the 1980s than in the 1960s (Bjorklund 
and Holmlund 1991). Labor market regulations, in particular the legislation on 
employment protection, may also have contributed to some increase in youth 
unemployment by making firms less likely to hire workers with little previous 
labor market experience. 
9.5  The Returns to Education and School Enrollment 
We  have documented a sharp fall and a subsequent modest rebound of  the 
university wage premium. How has the demand for higher education been af- 
fected by  these movements? It should be noted that the university wage pre- 
mium is an imperfect measure of  the private gains from university education. 
The private internal rate of return is also affected by  the progressivity of  the 337  The Swedish Wage Structure 
tax system, by tuitions, and by the availability and generosity of student loans 
and stipends. The Swedish tax system became gradually less progressive in the 
late 1980s; a new comprehensive tax system was introduced in 1990-91  with 
roughly 50 percent as the top marginal tax rate on labor earnings. Swedish 
university students have had access to stipends and subsidized loans since the 
early 1960s. A new student loan system was introduced in 1989. A university 
student receives a monthly tax-free sum of approximately 70 percent of a blue- 
collar worker’s average after-tax earnings; one-third of this sum is a pure sti- 
pend, and the remainder is a loan. 
Accounting for taxes and subsidized student loans has a substantial effect 
on calculations of the private internal rate of return to university education. We 
have undertaken calculations based on the standard procedure of  computing 
internal rates of return from a single cross section, thus ignoring general eco- 
nomic growth. We consider a man aged twenty who has left gymnasium and 
contemplates four years of university education. The estimated wage equations 
are used to calculate lifetime income profiles for the two alternatives assuming 
that retirement takes place at age sixty-five; the discount rate that equalizes the 
two paths is the private internal rate of return to university education. Any 
direct costs of education are ignored; tuition is essentially  zero in  Sweden, 
and other direct costs (books etc.) are probably offset by access to low-priced 
housing, drinking, and dancing. The first column of table 9.15 shows the rate 
of return unadjusted for taxes, and the second column accounts for taxes. The 
progressive tax system sharply reduced the return in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
while increasing wage differentials and lowered tax rates have increased the 
returns during recent years. 
The calculations reported in table 9.15 do not account for stipends, which 
of course will lead to an underestimate of the returns to education. (We cannot 
compare the old and the new student loan systems in a meaningful way without 
making explicit assumptions about inflation.) For 199  1 we have calculated the 
return to education assuming forward-looking expectations concerning4nfla- 
Table 9.15  Internal Rates of Return to Higher Education, Males, 1968-91, 
Static Expectations (%) 
Without Taxes  With Taxes 
1968  15.7  11.9 
1974  6.9  3.6 
1981  4.3  .5 
1984  3.9  1.7 
1986  5.3  3.3 
1988  4.7  2.7 
1991  6.0  4.5 
Note; The calculations are based on the estimated wage equations in table 9.2. The tax system that 
prevails in a particular year is assumed to remain intact over the individual’s life cycle. The calcula- 
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Table 9.16  Internal Rates of Return to Higher Education, Males, 1991, Forward- 
Looking Expectations (%) 
Without Taxes  With Taxes 
No stipends or loans  7.0  6.6 
Stipends and loans (8 percent interest rate)  9.8  11.0 
Note: The calculations are based on the estimated wage equations in table 9.2. The 1991 tax system 
is assumed to remain intact over the individual’s life cycle. The calculations are based on the 
assumptions of 4  percent annual nominal wage increases and a 3 percent rate of inflation. 
tion and general economic growth. This allows for shifts of the cross-sectional 
age-earnings profiles as well as movements along a given profile. We  assume 
4 percent nominal wage increases and 3 percent inflation. The 1991 tax system 
is assumed to prevail during the full life cycle. This produces a 7 percent return 
to university education in the absence of  taxes and stipends (table 9.16). The 
after-tax and after-stipend rate of return in 1991 is over 11 per~ent.’~ 
To what extent can movements in the rates of  return to education explain 
fluctuations in school enrollment? School enrollment among young adults has 
shown marked fluctuations, and there is a marked upward trend in the female 
enrollment rate (fig. 9.9). Enrollment peaked around 1968-71, declined during 
most of the 1970s, and started to rebound in the 1980s. Other data sources, 
capturing the number of students registered at the universities, show a similar 
pattern (see Fredriksson 1992). There is also a trend increase in school enroll- 
ment among prime-age individuals, presumably to a large extent driven by 
legislation permitting leaves of absence for education reasons. 
It is tempting to relate fluctuations in the enrollment rate among young 
adults to our estimated rates of return to education. If the male enrollment rate 
is regressed on the after-tax rate of return (RoR), we obtain 
ln(enrol1ment rate) = 2.19 + 3.36 * RoR, 
(5.33) 
where RoR is given by  the second column of  table 9.15 above (divided by 
100). The rate of return coefficient is highly significant (r = 5.33), and R2 is 
0.82. This is clearly consistent with the conventional wisdom that the demand 
for education is responsive to the prospective rates of return. It would be pre- 
mature, however, to place much confidence on the particular estimate obtained 
from a crude specification using only seven data points. We have therefore also 
exploited another data source, namely, the time series on private-sector wage 
13. The income tax system of 1991 has essentially two brackets. There is a large segment with 
a tax rate of roughly 30 percent. The marginal tax rate increases to 50 percent beyond a certain 
threshold. This threshold is indexed to inflation. It is also increased annually to prevent tax hikes 
owing to general economic growth (expected to be 2 percent per year). The rate of return would 
fall to 9 percent were the “real wage protection” rule of the tax system abolished. 339  The Swedish Wage Structure 
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Fig. 9.9  School enrollment rates among 20-24-year-olds,  1963-91 
Source: The labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
differentials between  male university and high  school graduates. The basic 
specification applied is 
where  U is the unemployment rate,  W the monthly salary, and T  the average 
tax rate; the subscripts u and g denote university and gymnasium, respectively. 
The independent variable can be thought of as the expected after-tax university 
wage premium. A higher unemployment risk among university graduates re- 
duces the expected returns to higher education; a higher unemployment rate 
among gymnasium graduates increases the relative attractiveness of higher ed- 
ucation. Unemployment among university graduates is represented by the un- 
employment rate in the unemployment insurance fund of  university graduates 
(Akademikernas arbetsloshetskassa),  whereas unemployment pertaining to the 
gymnasium category is represented by  the unemployment rate among male 
twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds according to the labor force surveys. 
The dynamic specification of equation (3) was chosen after a few experi- 
ments that suggested that the relative after-tax wage should be lagged one year. 
Table 9.17 gives the results of alternative regressions for the period 1968-91, 
where the restrictions implied by  equation (3) are successively relaxed. The 
model fits very well and conforms to our priors. The most restrictive specifica- 
tion in column 1 is only marginally improved on by relaxing the restrictions. 340  Per-Anders  Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
Table 9.17  Male School Enrollment and the Returns to Higher Education: 
Dependent Variable, In(enrollment  rate) 
Constant 




1.939  1.879 




(1  1.91) 
3.240 
(3.67) 
,852  .861 
,058  ,056 














Nore: The estimation period is 1968-91. Absolute t-values are in parentheses. 
In fact, the data accept the restrictions imposed in column 2 relative to the 
least restrictive form in column 3. The enrollment elasticity with respect to the 
relative wage is around two, very similar to estimates obtained in studies based 
on data from other countries (see Freeman 1986). 
The demand for higher education thus seems highly responsive to the re- 
turns to university education. The higher the university wage premium, the 
larger the fraction of twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds enrolled in education. 
The higher the degree of tax progressivity, the lower the demand for education. 
The late 1980s and the early 1990s have seen an increase in the returns to 
higher education through a rise in the university wage premium and via marked 
reductions in top marginal tax rates. Those changes will all contribute to a 
rising demand for higher education over the next few years. This scenario pre- 
supposes of course that the education system is responsive enough to increased 
demand for higher education. Restricted entry is as usual conducive to the 
emergence and persistence of rents in the labor market. 341  The Swedish Wage Structure 
9.6  Conclusions 
Our analysis of Swedish wage differentials over the past twenty-five years 
or so has identified two largely distinct periods. The period of pay compres- 
sion, lasting from the late 1960s and up to the early 1980s, involved dramatic 
changes in wage differentials across gender, experience, and education catego- 
ries. The (standardized) female/male wage ratio increased by  10 percentage 
points, and the returns to schooling and experience fell by  50 percent. The 
period of pay compression is followed by  a period of widening wage differen- 
tials, including a rebound of the returns to higher education. 
Swedish discussions of  the causes and consequences of  pay  compression 
have typically been centered around union wage policies in general and soli- 
darity wage bargaining in particular. Alternative plausible explanations have 
largely been ignored, however, and this may be a serious omission. Our analy- 
sis suggests that  a simple demand and  supply framework can account for 
movements in educational wage differentials as well as fluctuations in youth 
relative wages. The fall in the university wage premium is, according to our 
story, driven by  the rapid growth of  university graduates in the labor force, 
assuming a smooth trend relative demand growth. The rise in the university 
wage premium is then explained by  the fact that the growth of  the supply of 
more educated workers stops in  the mid-1980s. Changes in  youth  relative 
wages are analogously explained by fluctuations in the relative supply of young 
workers. It should be recognized, however, that we do not have much direct 
evidence on the nature of relative demand shifts. 
We do not offer formal models that are able to quantify the relative impor- 
tance of  market forces as opposed to union compression push. We  find the 
compression push story plausible for the LO-SAF area but seriously incom- 
plete as an explanation of  movements in the educational wage differentials. 
Suffice it to say that white-collar unions organizing workers with intermediate 
schooling levels could pursue successful pay compression policies because the 
market conditions favored wage moderation at the top end of  the earnings dis- 
tribution. The breakdown of centralized wage bargaining and the retreat from 
radical egalitarianism occur during a period where the market winds blow in 
favor of more educated workers. 
Fluctuations in the relative supply of more educated workers are determined 
by past school enrollment decisions, and the latter in turn are influenced by the 
prospective returns to higher education. The sharp fall from the mid-1980s in 
the rate of growth of university graduates can be viewed as a lagged response 
to falling returns to higher education. The rising returns in the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s reflect a higher university wage premium as well as policy 
decisions on taxes and subsidized student loans. The increase in the returns to 
investment in higher education is likely to further increase school enrollment 
and subsequently depress educational wage differentials. 342  Per-Anders Edin and Bertil Holmlund 
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